Includes bibliographical references and index.

Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide --I︣ntended v. foreseen life-shortening --T︣he value of human life --T︣he value of autonomy --L︣egal hypocrisy? --T︣he slippery slope arguments --T︣he guidelines --T︣he first survey: the incidence of "euthanasia" --B︣reach of the guidelines --T︣he slide towards nvae --T︣he second survey --T︣he dutch in denial? --T︣he euthanasia act and the code of practice --E︣ffective control since 2002? --C︣ontinuing concerns --A︣ right to physician-assisted suicide by stopping eating and drinking? --A︣ssisted suicide for the elderly with "completed lives" --T︣he belgian legislation --B︣elgium's lack of effective control --T︣he northern territory: rotti --T︣he united states: oregon and six other jurisdictions --T︣he us supreme court: glucksberg and vacco --T︣he supreme court of canada : the carter case --C︣anada's euthanasia legislation --C︣onclusion.

This book argues against the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide on the ground that, even if they were ethically defensible in certain 'hard cases', neither could be effectively controlled by law. It maintains that the experience of legalisation in the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon lends support to the two 'slippery slope' arguments against legalisation, the 'empirical' and the 'logical'. The empirical argument challenges the feasibility of drafting and enforcing adequate safeguards against abuse and mistake; the logical argument shows that acceptance of the case for euthanasia in the case of suffering patients who request it logically involves acceptance of euthanasia for suffering patients who are unable to request it, such as infants and those with advanced dementia.